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Book Note
THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Stephen
Gardbaum 1
NICOLAS FRANCIS
THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS under constitutional law is usually considered to

function under either one of two polar options: legislative supremacy,2 derived from
the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy; or constitutional supremacy,3
derived from the American tradition of an entrenched, judicially enforced bill
of rights. In his new book, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,
Stephen Gardbaum argues that a third, superior model of constitutionalism exists
that draws on the strengths of the two traditional paradigms without harbouring
the weaknesses found within either of them.
Gardbaum situates the new model in an intermediate position between the
two traditional forms by identifying its three central features. First, there must be
a legalized bill or charter of rights. Second, there must be some form of judicial
power to interpret and enforce these rights by assessing legislation. Third, and
most distinctively, there must be a legislative power that maintains the final word
on the law by way of an override power.4
1.
2.

3.

4.

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 270 pages.
See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115:6
Yale LJ 1346; Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008);
Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of
Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
Supra note 1 at 34.
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The new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism is named after the
four countries on which Gardbaum focuses (Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and Australia).5 His book has two main goals.6 It aims to present the
new Commonwealth model as a novel model of constitutionalism, and it assesses
whether and to what extent the model is currently operating. To achieve these
goals, it is divided into two parts that respectively explore the theory and practice
of the new model.
After a brief introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 explains the new model and
attempts to distinguish it from the two traditional forms of constitutionalism by
identifying what is new about the new model.7 Gardbaum argues that its novelty
lies in its combining of two forms of rights protection—political rights review and
weak-form judicial review—while providing a clear mechanism to separate
judicial review from judicial supremacy.8
Chapter 3 shifts from an analytical to a normative argument, presenting the
general case for the new model as a third and intermediate form of constitutionalism.9
This chapter engages with the debate about the merits of judicial review.10 Gardbaum
argues that the new model permits “proportional representation” of the best arguments
for legislative and constitutional supremacy, and minimizes the weaknesses of the
two paradigms. This is because central to the new model is both weak-form
legislative review and weak-form judicial review.11
Chapter 4 develops the internal normative theory for the new model by
discussing how the model ought to ideally function.12 This chapter explores the
Ibid at 11.
Ibid at 16.
Ibid at 21.
Ibid at 33.
Ibid at 47.
See e.g. Richard H Fallon Jr, “The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review” (2008) 121:7
Harv L Rev 1693; Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, “The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review”
(2010) 2:1 J Legal Analysis 1; Mattias Kumm, “Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The
Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review”
(2007) 1:2 European J L Stud 1; Mattias Kumm, “Democracy is not Enough: Rights,
Proportionality and the Point of Judicial Review” in Matthias Klatt, ed, Institutionalized
Reason: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mark
Tushnet, “How Different are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases for and against Judicial
Review” (2010) 30:1 Oxford J L Stud 49; Waldron, supra note 2; Wil Waluchow, A Common
Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
11. Supra note 1 at 61.
12. Ibid at 77.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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norms that ought to govern each of the three stages of the new model, and also
explores the question of when a legislature should exercise its legal override power.
In Part II, the book shifts from the theoretical to the practical. Chapters 5
to 8 describe four instantiations—Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and Australia respectively—of the new model. Within these chapters, Gardbaum
assesses how successful each version of the model is in delivering the theoretical
benefits discussed in Part I, and he identifies the major practical problems that
have emerged within each jurisdiction.
Chapter 9 ties the previous chapters together and presents an assessment
of the analytical and normative claims made in Part I in light of the “operational
experience” presented in chapters 5 to 8.13 In the process, Gardbaum also critically
examines sceptical claims that the new model is unstable or insufficiently unique
from constitutional supremacy. Acknowledging the difficulties in adhering to the
theoretical framework of the new model, Gardbaum concludes by providing a
series of reforms that may help the new model better achieve its normative goals
in practice.
The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism is an ambitious project
with significant implications for constitutional theory and practice. The new
model, if truly a viable alternative to legislative and constitutional supremacy, will
fundamentally recast the choice constitutional drafters encounter when dealing
with the subject of rights protection.

13. Ibid at 222.

